ÀÏ˾»úÎçÒ¹¸£Àû

View the related checklists about Purposive approach

Ramsay case law—chronology and cheat sheet

Ramsay case law—chronology and cheat sheet The following table lists, in reverse chronological order, cases that have been important in the development of the Ramsay anti-avoidance principle. It is not a list of every case that has discussed the principle. It is weighted towards the present in the sense that decisions of lower courts are more likely to feature in the list if they are relatively recent, and so demonstrate the latest judicial thinking. For a general introduction to the Ramsay principle, see Practice Note: Ramsay as a guide to statutory construction. For comprehensive tax case tracking across current (and recently completed) tax cases, see the: Tax—cases tracker. Case name and citation Who won in the highest court? Facts in a nutshell Quote(s) from the judgment Comment Michael Brown, Bridget Brown [2024] EWCA Civ 92 The government (in the Court of Appeal) Scheme for avoiding SDLT ‘...no statute is immune from a purposive interpretation, and the very mistake that this court made in Rossendale was to...

View the related practice notes about Purposive approach

Construing post-termination restrictions

The construction, or interpretation, of post-termination restrictions essentially follows the same rules of construction as are used in interpreting any other type of contractual term.The starting position is that a restriction in restraint of trade is generally unlawful and a post-termination restriction will only be reasonable, and lawful, if it does no more than the minimum necessary to protect an employer's legitimate business interests (see Practice Notes: Restraint of trade in employment and Legitimate business interest). This means that restrictions should be drafted by reference to the employer’s specific business and the employee’s role in that business, and in the clearest possible language.Two other general points apply:•as far as possible a common sense approach should be taken to issues of construction, see in particular Ordinary meaning, below•relying on support from case law for the construction of a particular clause or a specific word is unwise, given that each word in a contract will be construed in the context of that contract, which will almost certainly be different from the one...

Methods of statutory interpretation used to resolve disputes about the meaning of legislation

Introduction to statutory interpretationThe aim of statutory interpretation is to arrive at the legal meaning of legislation, or in other words, the meaning that conveys the legislative intention. The primary indication of legislative intention is the legislative text, read in context and having regard to its purpose. The court should aim to give effect to the purpose of legislation by interpreting its language, so far as possible, in a way which best gives effect to that purpose. In other words, the courts’ basic approach to interpretation is purposive, and every enactment is to be given a purposive construction.There is a presumption that the grammatical meaning of an enactment is the meaning intended by the legislator. Where an enactment is capable of only one meaning and other interpretative principles or factors do not raise any real doubt as to that meaning, the enactment is to be given its plain meaning. In this case, the plain meaning will align with the legislative purpose.But where there is doubt about the meaning of legislation...

View the related q&as about Purposive approach

Where property is held on bare trusts for a minor beneficiary and the trustees exercise their power of advancement under section 32 of the Trustee Act 1925 to create new substantive trusts (such as a trust with an age contingency for the beneficiary of age 25), would the beneficiary make a disposition, and therefore a transfer of value, for inheritance tax purposes?

Where property is held on bare trusts for a minor beneficiary and the trustees exercise their power of advancement under section 32 of the Trustee Act 1925 to create new substantive trusts (such as a trust with an age contingency for the beneficiary of age 25), would the beneficiary make a disposition, and therefore a transfer of value, for inheritance tax purposes? This Q&A assumes that the trust does not exclude the power of advancement in section 32 of the Trustee Act 1925 (TA 1925). Where property is held on trust for a minor absolutely, the value of the property would be within the estate of the minor for inheritance tax purposes, by virtue of section 5 to the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (IHTA 1984). The trustees may exercise a power of advancement pursuant to TA 1925, s 32 if that advancement is for the benefit of a beneficiary of the trust who is entitled to capital, whether absolutely or contingently and subject to the other provisions...

In the context of the loan capital exemption from stamp duty which (among other things) requires that the loan capital does not carry and has never carried a right to interest dependent on results of a business (or any part of a business) or to the value of any property, is there any guidance on the meaning of ‘results’ and, specifically, on whether sustainability targets of a business count as results?

In the context of the loan capital exemption from stamp duty which (among other things) requires that the loan capital does not carry and has never carried a right to interest dependent on results of a business (or any part of a business) or to the value of any property, is there any guidance on the meaning of ‘results’ and, specifically, on whether sustainability targets of a business count as results? See Practice Note: Loan capital exemption from stamp duty, which covers the loan capital exemption from stamp duty and its interaction with stamp duty reserve tax (SDRT), ie that loan capital which falls within the loan capital exemption from stamp duty is not a chargeable security so that an agreement to transfer that loan capital does not attract SDRT. In particular, see section: No exemption if right to results-dependent interest of Practice Note which explains the provision in section 79(6)(b) of the Finance Act 1986 (FA 1986) which states: ‘Subject to subsections (7) to (7B) below,...

View the related News about Purposive approach

Claim based on Paris Agreement qualifies for costs-capping (R (Global Feedback Limited) v Majesty’s Treasury and another)

Environment analysis: The applicant (an environmental protection charity) was granted an order capping the recoverable costs of judicial review proceedings under CPR 46.24–28 (applicable to claims falling within the Aarhus Convention). The underlying proceedings challenge regulations implementing the UK’s obligations under a free trade agreement with Australia (‘2023 Regulations’). The court found that the claim was brought within the terms of the Aarhus Convention (under which the UK must ensure that members of the public have access to procedures enabling challenge to acts which ‘contravene provisions of national law relating to the environment’) by: the claimants’ claim that the defendant public bodies had breached national law (the Taxation (Cross Border Trade) Act 2018 (TCTA 2018)) which arguably required them to take into account the UK’s obligations under the Paris Agreement when making the 2023 Regulations; and the nature of the claims made, which relate to the environmental impacts of allegedly failing to take into account ‘carbon leakage’ (differing carbon emissions across jurisdictions) resulting from cattle meat production. Written by Sarah...

FTT decides UK business was liable for employers’ NICs under host employer rules (Bilfinger Salamis v HMRC)

Tax analysis: In Bilfinger Salamis, the First-tier Tax Tribunal (FTT) dismissed the appellant’s appeal, finding that it was liable to account for employers’ NICs under the so-called ‘host employer’ provisions in paragraph 9 of Schedule 3 to the Social Security (Categorisation of Earners) Regulations 1978, SI 1978/1689.